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The neurocognitive approach points out how reduced self-awareness is related to cerebral
disorders, particularly concerning focal lesions, emotional and motivational determinants, and
concurrent neuropsychological impairments (Palermo, 2017). Given its consequences on patients’
quality of life, caregivers’ burn-out, compliance with treatment, and prognosis, reduced self-
awareness has received increasing attention on the part of neuroscientists (Fernández-Calvo et al.,
2015). Indeed, a reduction in self-awareness has been found to be associated with a decline in help-
seeking behavior and compliance with medical treatment, presumably because of a reduction in
motivation (Palermo, 2017).
In their brilliant mini-review, Bertrand and colleagues drew attention to the fact that
neurological and neuropsychiatric patients can present severe—and often underestimated—
impairments in metacognitive abilities that may result in “a lack of self-awareness of deficits.”
Indeed, executive-metacognitive dysfunctions have been formerly associated with loss of self-
awareness across major neurocognitive disorders likely due to Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and
frontotemporal dementia (Amanzio et al., 2011, 2013, 2016), Acquired Brain Injury (Palermo
et al., 2014), Bipolar Disorder (Palermo et al., 2015) and Parkinson’s Disease (Amanzio et al., 2014;
Palermo et al., 2017a,b).
Focusing on AD, Bertrand et al. (2016) dwelt on the association between metacognition and
perspective-taking as a key aspect for improving quality of life in AD patients. These authors
specified that “metacognition refers to the monitoring and regulation of cognitive processes and its
impairment can lead to a lack of self-awareness of deficits, or anosognosia” (Bertrand et al., 2016,
p. 1).
Anosognosia and reduced self-awareness are frequently used as synonyms in the literature and
an overlap between them has been highlighted. This is a delicate question because according
to the interpretation given to those terms, the methods of detection and interpretation of the
phenomenon could change. This topic was recently treated by Mograbi and Morris (2018). In
their interesting Discussion Forum, the authors not only emphasize how the term anosognosia
continues to be the most used in the neurological field, but propose a glossary of labels that
enhances the differences in use and interpretation of the epiphenomena to which they refer.
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In our opinion, the notion of “self-awareness” is not
entirely concerned with the concept of “anosognosia,” since the
former is a complex neuropsychological notion, defined as “the
ability to consciously process information about ourselves in a
manner that reflects a relatively objective view while maintaining
our unique phenomenological or subjective sense of self ”
(Prigatano, 1997, p. 301). Indeed, awareness of illness is above all
a form of self-knowledge and a higher-order cognitive function
covering information about the state of the disease, its functional
consequences, the way in which it affects the patient and
influences his/her interaction with the environment (Palermo,
2017). In support of this theoretical framework, Stuss et al. (2001)
and Stuss and Anderson (2004) argued that there are several
types of self-awareness (the so-called “consciousness” in their
theoretical framework), organized hierarchically, which should
be differentiated.As we have previously outlined, they proposed
different elements in a four-level hierarchical framework of
awareness, “where the processing in turn operates in a modular
manner at any level of the hierarchy, so that damage in one
functional domain may result in a different kind of reduced self-
awareness” (Palermo et al., 2014, p. 541). These four types of
self-awareness have their own neural underpinnings in distinct
substrates, with the lower levels related to a selective disturbance
of knowledge [anosognosia] and the higher levels related to
self-awareness, perspective-taking and Theory of Mind, with
an emphasis on the role of the frontal and medial prefrontal
brain areas (Palermo, 2017). Indeed, the cognitive processes
involved in metacognitive-executive functions and Theory of
Mind have been associated with complex ecological contexts
that require the recruitment of the anterior cingulate cortex
and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Morese et al., 2016).
Moreover, (O‘Keeffe et al., 2007). proposed that any disturbance
in monitoring, cognitive flexibility and response inhibition
has the potential to distort patients’ foresight (and thus self
-awareness).
Bertrand et al. (2016) suggested that the Default Mode
Network may be useful to shed light on the role of perspective-
taking in awareness of deficits in AD. They presented this
relationship by referring to the Cognitive Awareness Model
(CAM), which incorporates a comparator system within the
central executive to detect mismatches between a personal
database and experience of failures and successes (Agnew and
Morris, 1998). When a discrepancy is found, a signal is sent
out to the metacognitive awareness system (the fourth level
in the model by Stuss et al., 2001), enabling a conscious
experience of failure/success. If the executive system does not
work properly, the comparator mechanism may not detect
mismatches, and subsequently experienced failures may not
produce any metacognitive output or conscious awareness,
leading to an “executive unawareness” in the CAM (Agnew and
Morris, 1998).
This model was applied by Amanzio et al. (2011), who
addressed the relationship between executive dysfunctions and
reduced self-awareness in AD using fMRI and an event-related
specific executive task (a Go/NoGo task adapted from Braver
et al., 2001; Palermo et al., 2018). Their findings suggest
that lower self-awareness in AD patients is linked to reduced
functional recruitment in the medial prefrontal circuit, in
particular in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) (Amanzio
et al., 2011). Furthermore, response-inhibition, self-monitoring,
and set-shifting dysfunctions have to be considered prominent
features of reduced self-awareness in AD patients (Amanzio et al.,
2011, 2013), while apathy and disinhibition would seem to be
the first relevant behavior changes in AD patients with reduced
self-awareness (Amanzio et al., 2011).
In conclusion, reduced self-awareness is often observed in
AD patients who have suffered major damage to the central
executive system. This could be due to the fact that the
central executive system is a metacognitive facility of interest
in controlling the flow of information in tasks requiring
initiation, planning, set-shifting, strategy allocation, monitoring
and inhibition (Amanzio et al., 2011, 2013). As indicated
by Bertrand et al. (2016), the CAM is one of the most
fruitful models for understanding the irrefutable liaison between
executive system dysfuntion, metacognitive disabilities and the
occurrence of reduced self-awareness. The issues raised in
this commentary have implications in considering executive-
metacognitive disabilities as a neuropsychological marker for
reduced self-awareness in AD.
We would like to conclude by drawing attention to the fact
that this phenomenon is worthy of clinical investigation. Indeed,
distinct major neurocognitive disorders, brain pathologies
and mood disturbances exhibit executive-metacognitive
abnormalities as part of the anomalies of overlapping neural
pathways. In this context, ACC hypofunctionality seems to
represent one of the relevant underpinnings of a lack of
self-awareness (Amanzio et al., 2011; Palermo et al., 2014, 2015).
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